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INTRODUCTION 
Incarceration incapacitates only very incompletely.  This 
observation is not new.1  It is, however, worthy of further 
emphasis and discussion because any contrary statement 
discounts prison crime and excludes inmates from the 
relevant measuring population (“society”).  To arrive at this 
conclusion, this essay first constructs a definition of 
incapacitation that recognizes two distinct types of 
incapacitation: offense-specific incapacitation and victim-
specific incapacitation.  The former concerns limitations on 
the offender’s range of conduct while the latter focuses on 
limitations on the offender’s access to particular populations.2
 
 * Associate Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor of Professional 
Practice, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.  Many thanks 
to Ken Levy for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay as well 
as to Graham Polando for his thoughtful suggestions. 
  
Next, the essay applies this framework to incarceration and 
determines that this mode of punishment achieves both types 
 1. See infra note 46. 
 2. See infra Part I. 
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of incapacitation only to a partial degree.3  However, 
incarceration’s incapacitative benefits are often overstated by 
excluding inmates from the world of persons worthy of 
protection.4  Such descriptions improperly imply a diminished 
interest in protecting inmates and should be avoided.5
I. THE RESTRAINT OF MISCHIEF 
 
Incapacitation is the removal of an offender’s ability to 
commit future crime against a relevant population.6  It has 
long ago secured itself in the pantheon of generally accepted 
purposes of punishment7 alongside general and specific 
deterrence,8 retributivist notions of just deserts,9 and the 
elusive ideal of rehabilitation.10  Despite the importance of 
incapacitation theory in modern sentencing schemes, it has 
received comparatively little scholarly attention relative to 
the other, “more sophisticated,” purposes of punishment.11
 
 3. See infra Part II. 
  By 
 4. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. More generally, incapacitation is defined as “[t]he action of disabling or 
depriving of legal capacity” or “[t]he state of being disabled or lacking legal 
capacity.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 2009).  
 7. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a) (1962) (listing crime 
prevention as a purpose of punishment); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 cmt. 3(a) 
(1985) (explaining that crime prevention encompasses “incapacitating persons 
who are dangerously disposed to engage in criminal conduct”); 1 JEREMY 
BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 
396 (1843) (“If the crime he has committed is of a kind calculated to inspire 
great alarm, as manifesting a very mischievous disposition, it becomes 
necessary to take from him the power of committing it again.”). 
 8. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 2.2 (2d ed. 1991) 
(“Special deterrence defends criminal penalties as a way to disincline individual 
offenders from repeating the same or other criminal acts.”).  Specific, or 
“special,” deterrence differs from general deterrence in that general deterrence 
is concerned with the future actions of the public at large rather than those of 
the punished individual.  See id. 
 9. “To the retributivist, punishment of a wrongdoer is justified because he 
deserves to be punished. . . . Unlike utilitarianism, retributivism is premised on 
the view that punishment of wrongdoers is morally right whether or not it 
provides any future social gain.”  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 6 (1st ed. 1987), quoted in CAMPBELL, supra note 8, § 2.5.  
 10. The rehabilitative model “use[s] the correctional system to reform the 
wrongdoer rather than to secure compliance through the fear or ‘bad taste’ of 
punishment.  The methods of reformation will vary from case to case, but could 
consist of, for example, psychiatric care, therapy for drug addiction, or academic 
or vocational training.”  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15 
(6th ed. 2012).  
 11. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
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and large, the current incapacitation literature focuses on 
quantitative analyses of how well incarceration achieves the 
larger goal of crime reduction.12  These studies require 
complex predictions involving the substitution effects of other 
offenders filling the crime void created by imprisoning the 
incarcerated offender.13
A punishment achieves incapacitation when it strips a 
person of the power to commit future crimes regardless of her 
will to do so.  Because incapacitation focuses on a person’s 
ability rather than on her will, a punishment generally 
requires a physical component to incapacitate: “body 
operating upon body is sufficient to the task.”
  The baser, but more often bypassed, 
question that remains is whether, how, and to what extent 
imprisonment incapacitates the incarcerated offender herself. 
14
 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 157 (1995) (“The reliance of 
incapacitation on the physical control of offenders renders it a low-technology 
criminal sanction . . . .”); 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon Versus New South 
Wales: Or, the Panopticon Penitentiary System, and the Penal Colonization 
System, Compared, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 184–
86 (discussing the punishment of incapacitation (“it may be aimed at almost 
without thought”) versus rehabilitation (“a very complex object: thought and 
contrivance are necessary to the pursuit of it”)); see also Andrew D. Leipold, 
Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS. 
L.J. 536, 542 (2006) (“As a rationale for current practice, incapacitation . . . has 
the virtue of avoiding many of the contentious questions that surround other 
punishment rationales.  We need not wrestle with difficult questions of whether 
higher punishments deter, either specifically or collectively; nor do we need a 
consensus on whether it is morally appropriate or repellent to give voice to 
retributive instincts in doling out punishment.  We can hope that prisoners are 
rehabilitated (as most people do), but as long as they are in prison, we worry far 
less about the downsides of the failures of rehabilitative efforts.”  (footnote 
omitted)).  
  
 12. See, e.g., WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION (1994); 
STEPHEN VAN DINE, JOHN P. CONRAD & SIMON DINITZ, RESTRAINING THE 
WICKED: THE INCAPACITATION OF THE DANGEROUS CRIMINAL (1979); ZIMRING & 
HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 79–127; Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do 
Three Strikes Laws Make Sense?  Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal 
Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998); Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison 
Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 
111 Q.J. ECON. 319 (1996); Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime?  
Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 
551, 551 (2009); Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. 
REV. 1049, 1108 (2008) (concluding that imprisonment may actually cause more 
crime than it prevents); Ben Vollaard, Preventing Crime Through Selective 
Incapacitation, 123 ECON. J. 262 (2013).  
 13. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 55–56 (theorizing that 
substitution is more likely for offenses that involve a market for illicit goods and 
services, such as drug distribution and prostitution).  
 14. BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 186.  In some instances, non-physical 
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Incapacitation’s focus on the ability of an offender creates an 
important conceptual distinction between incapacitation and 
deterrence.  A punishment achieves specific deterrence when 
it alters the will of the person being punished so that the 
person elects to forgo future crime.15  No physical component 
is necessary to alter a person’s will—the threat of punishment 
may be sufficient.  The potential of receiving a speeding ticket 
deters many people from speeding, even though it does not 
incapacitate them from doing so.  Increased likelihood of 
detection—like monitoring a probationer with an ankle 
bracelet—may also deter future wrongdoing without actually 
incapacitating the individual.16
Thus, to design a punishment that incapacitates, a 
governing authority must first identify the offense or offenses 
it wishes to inhibit as well as the relevant population it 
wishes to protect.  Once these two variables are identified, the 
governing authority must determine what the offender needs 
in order to commit the identified offenses against the relevant 
population and deny the offender access to those resources. 
 
The same calculus can be applied—albeit backwardly—to 
existing punishments to measure their incapacitative 
achievements and shortcomings.  Just as some punishments 
partially rehabilitate, partially deter, or partially serve up a 
just desert, most punishments only partially incapacitate.  A 
punishment’s incapacitative achievements can be measured 
with regard to both offense-specific incapacitation as well as 
victim-specific incapacitation.  The former focuses on 
limitations on the offender’s range of conduct.  The latter 
focuses on limitations on the offender’s access to particular 
populations. 
With regard to either type of incapacitation, a 
punishment’s effectiveness may be measured along a sliding 
scale with “negligible inhibition” on one end and “absolute 
denial of capacity” on the other.  Of course, a single 
 
punishments such as fines or shaming carry some crime-inhibiting effects.  See 
infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 15. Owens, supra note 12, at 552 (“A deterred offender is able to commit 
crime but chooses not to, whereas an incapacitated offender would choose to 
commit crime but is unable to do so.”).  
 16. Extremely close monitoring that could actually physically intervene 
should the offender attempt to commit an offense, such as the constant presence 
of a band of officers alongside a probationer, could rise to the level of 
incapacitation. 
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punishment may partially incapacitate an offender with 
respect to both categories, but it is the rare punishment that 
fully achieves both.  Only death absolutely incapacitates an 
offender from committing all future offenses against all 
potential victims.17  For all other punishments, incapacitation 
is a matter of degree along both spectrums.18
A. Offense-Specific Incapacitation 
 
The degree of offense-specific incapacitation is dictated 
by two variables: (1) the range of offense conduct that is 
inhibited by the punishment, and (2) the level of difficulty 
with which the offender can circumvent the barrier to re-
offending.  A punishment may be designed to inhibit an 
offender’s ability to commit crime in general or may be 
specifically tailored to impede the offender from committing a 
specific category of offenses.  Either way, most non-capital 
barriers to reoffending may be overcome by a particularly 
strong or cunning offender. 
Consider the often specifically targeted effects of 
punishments that involve physically mutilating the offender.  
Surgical castration of a sex offender inhibits the offender’s 
ability to engage in only a relatively narrow category of 
offenses, but is highly effective at inhibiting those offenses.19
Other punishments, such as death and imprisonment, 
are less targeted toward the incapacitation of specific offenses 
than the offender’s ability to commit crime in general.  Death, 
of course, impedes the offender from committing any and all 
future offense.  As described later, imprisonment achieves 
varying levels of offense-specific incapacitation by impairing 
the offender’s access to the various resources necessary to 
  
In comparison, cutting off a thief’s hands inhibits the offender 
from committing the entire range of offenses that are made 
easier by having hands, but likely does not achieve absolute 
incapacitation with regard to any offense, including stealing. 
 
 17. See JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 58 (1975); 
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968). 
 18. PACKER, supra note 17, at 48.  
 19. See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical 
Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. 
THOMAS. L.J. 559, 577–78 (2006) (describing castration’s incapacitative effects); 
see also Steven S. Kan, Corporal Punishments and Incapacitation, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 121, 124–26 (1996).  
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commit certain crimes.20
Whether targeted at certain offenses or criminal activity 
in general, a punishment only incapacitates to the extent that 
the offender is unable to overcome the restriction placed upon 
her.  Death is impossible to overcome.  Mutilation may be 
overcome with prosthesis.  Effective confinement is limited by 
the barriers to escape. 
 
Most non-physical restraints fail to incapacitate.21  The 
subject of a restraining order may elect to abide by the 
restriction for fear of the punishment attendant to violating 
the order, but such a choice is a product of the deterrent effect 
of the potential punishment, not of any actual incapacitation.  
Similarly, taking away a drunk driver’s operating license 
carries no incapacitative benefits because it does not actually 
impede the offender from committing any future offense, 
including drunk driving.22
Nonetheless, some non-physical punishments carry 
incapacitative effects in certain circumstances.  One study 
found that fines were more effective than incarceration at 
reducing the incidence of public drunkenness among the very 
poor, presumably because the fines drained funds that would 
otherwise be spent on alcohol.
  Physically impeding the offender’s 
ability to drive drunk by installing a breathalyzer lock in her 
vehicle, on the other hand, does inhibit the offender from 
future drunk driving, albeit only to a minor extent because 
the offender retains the capacity to drive other vehicles while 
intoxicated or circumvent the breathalyzer lock with the 
assistance of a sober person. 
23
 
 20. See infra Part I.B.  
  Thus, a fine that is large 
 21. A restraint need not be a “punishment” in the criminal sense to carry 
incapacitative benefits.  Many protective actions may be considered 
incapacitative shields.  Placing a locking mechanism on a vehicle’s steering 
wheel—or simply locking the doors of an unattended vehicle—makes theft of 
that vehicle more difficult.  Likewise, armoring a vehicle with bullet-proof glass 
makes assassination of the inhabitants of the vehicle more challenging.  See 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 156 (discussing “environmental 
adjustments” as a strategy of crime prevention). 
 22. See id. at 160.  
 23. See Keith Lovald & Holger R. Stub, The Revolving Door: Reactions of 
Chronic Drunkenness Offenders to Court Sanctions, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 
& POLICE SCI. 525, 529 (1968) (finding that fines were more effective than 
incarceration at increasing the time between court appearances on charges of 
public drunkenness among the generally impoverished residents of 
Minneapolis’s “Skid Row”). 
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relative to the financial resources of an offender partially 
incapacitates the offender from committing future offenses 
that would be made easier by having money.24
On the other end of the spectrum, researchers have 
linked shaming to incapacitation of white-collar offenders 
because future would-be victims will avoid engaging in 
financial transactions with known criminals.
  The poor lack 
the ability to commit some offenses—especially the purchase 
of expensive illicit items—simply because they lack material 
resources.  Therefore, a fine that impoverishes the offender 
will impede the offender from committing certain future 
offenses. 
25  However, bad 
publicity is less likely to incapacitate the super-rich because 
they are more able to use their considerable means to seek 
out potential victims in fresh social circles.26
Incapacitative punishments—or, indeed, restraints of any 
kind—are rarely so well designed so as to incapacitate only 
the targeted activity.  Rather, a restraint of an offender’s 
ability to commit further illegal activity will invariably lead 
to collateral incapacitation that inhibits the offender’s ability 
to engage in legal, potentially beneficial activity as well.  The 
handless thief will find it challenging to engage in a variety of 
constructive undertakings.  The offender impoverished 
through a fine is unable to invest in a small business or 
  Thus, while 
non-physical punishments like fines and shaming may carry 
some incapacitative effects, these effects are highly offense-
specific and are likely more than negligible only when applied 
against the “right” offender. 
 
 24. Although wealth may also enhance an offender’s ability to escape 
apprehension or conviction, that aspect is one of deterrence rather than 
incapacitation. 
 25. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: 
A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 
365, 370–71 (1999) (arguing that publicized shaming effectively incapacitates a 
white-collar criminal because others avoid dealing with the offender and “[i]t is 
as though he walks around surrounded by bars”); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, 
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1899–1900 (1991) 
(arguing that incapacitation theory supports shaming sanctions because other 
members of society may avoid contact with known offenders).  
 26. See Michael Levi, Suite Justice or Sweet Charity?  Some Explorations of 
Shaming and Incapacitating Business Fraudsters, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 147, 
158–59 (2002) (concluding that white-collar offenders “with limited social and 
geographic mobility” are most susceptible to shaming but that the punishment 
is less effective against the super-rich, especially in a “mobile, global culture”).  
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donate money toward charitable purposes.  The executed 
criminal is unable to contribute to society at all.  At some 
point, the disutility associated with the collateral 
incapacitation of valuable activity outweighs the utility 
conferred by the incapacitation of harmful activity and makes 
punishment irrational from a utilitarian perspective.27
In summary, a punishment’s effectiveness at achieving 
offense-specific incapacitation depends on the degree to which 
the punishment inhibits the offender from committing future 
offenses—measured by the range of future offenses inhibited, 
the extent to which the punishment restricts the commission 
of those future offenses, and the ease with which the offender 
can overcome the barrier to reoffending. 
 
B. Victim-Specific Incapacitation 
Incapacitation can also be measured by the degree to 
which a punishment alters the population of potential 
victims.  Some punishments inhibit an offender’s ability to 
victimize a particular population without interfering with the 
offender’s ability to commit any particular offense.  The 
measuring population may be as specific as a single 
individual or “preferred victim.”  To achieve victim-specific 
incapacitation, a punishment must separate the offender from 
the relevant population or impose some sort of barrier 
between the offender and the relevant population of potential 
victims. 
A classic example of victim-specific incapacitation is the 
punishment variously known as exile, transportation, or 
deportation.  Exile physically removes an offender from a 
particular jurisdiction; thus, it limits the offender’s ability to 
commit future crimes in that jurisdiction.  On its own, 
however, exile imposes no incapacitative restraints on the 
offender in the land of banishment.  By only relocating the 
mischief-maker, exile simply exchanges one population of 
potential victims for another.28
 
 27. Weighing collateral incapacitation against crime prevention could lead 
to the reluctance to punish “productive” members of society.  Such 
determinations, however, are well beyond the purview of this essay, which is 
aimed at measuring the nuts and bolts of incapacitation in practice rather than 
its theoretical underpinnings. 
  Thus, the incapacitative 
 28. To the extent that exile separates the offender from a preferred victim, 
it inhibits the offender’s ability to victimize the preferred victim.  But, on the 
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“success” of exile is jurisdictionally-dependent.  If the justice 
system measures success only with regard to the sentencing 
jurisdiction, then exile may be quite an effective means of 
incapacitation.29
Offense-specific incapacitation is always a rational goal of 
punishment because it reduces the offender’s ability to 
commit crime.  However, victim-specific incapacitation is not 
always rational because it may simply trade one population of 
potential victims for another.
  But if incapacitative success is measured on 
a global scale, then exile is a decidedly ineffective 
punishment. 
30
To illustrate, the victimization of the inhabitants of 
Australia was unimportant to the British sentencing 
authority at the close of the eighteenth century.
  Victim-specific incapacitation 
is only a rational goal of punishment to the extent that the 
sentencing entity (1) prefers the victimization of one 
population over another or (2) knows that the offender is 
more likely to victimize one population relative to another. 
31
 
converse, it also exposes the offender to an entire population of potential victims 
that may have previously been beyond her reach. 
  Thus, exile 
of British offenders to New South Wales was a rational 
punishment.  Likewise, if a sex offender is known to be more 
likely to victimize females than males, it is rational to 
segregate the sex offender from females because such 
segregation will likely decrease the offender’s rate of 
offending.  But assuming that the federal government has no 
preference with regard to the victimization of Kansans or 
 29. But note that exile’s incapacitative effects are only offense-specific: 
although exile may impose a formidable barrier against an offender assaulting 
an inhabitant of the sentencing jurisdiction, it imposes a markedly less 
formidable barrier against committing other offenses against the inhabitants of 
the sentencing jurisdiction that do not require physical presence in the 
jurisdiction. 
 30. If a punishment were to inhibit an offender’s ability to victimize all 
people, the punishment would achieve both offense-specific incapacitation as 
well as victim-specific incapacitation.  For example, banishing an offender to an 
uninhabited desert island creates offense-specific incapacitation because it 
impedes the offender’s ability to commit a whole host of offenses at all rather 
than merely inhibiting the offender’s ability to engage in victim selection or 
access a particular population. 
 31. BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 183 (noting that the exile of British 
offenders to New South Wales “render[ed] it impossible for a man to do any 
more such mischief in the only spot in the world worth thinking about. . . . 
[H]ow the people thus sent thither behaved while there, was a point which, so 
long as they did but stay there, or, at any rate, did not come back here, was not 
worth thinking about.”).  
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Nebraskans and offenders would victimize the inhabitants of 
either state at the same rate, it would be irrational for the 
federal government to exile offenders from one state to 
another as part of a scheme of victim-specific incapacitation. 
Like offense-specific incapacitation, the second 
component of victim-specific incapacitation is the 
effectiveness of the barrier that separates the offender from 
the relevant measuring population.  Exile’s effectiveness at 
impeding an offender from physically harming an inhabitant 
of the sentencing jurisdiction is largely dependent on how 
difficult it will be for the offender to re-enter the sentencing 
jurisdiction.  Kansas state authorities may favor the exile of 
offenders to Nebraska, but the ease with which offenders can 
cross back over the state line greatly decreases the 
effectiveness of protecting Kansas citizens by transporting 
offenders from Topeka to Omaha.  In the late eighteen 
century, the prospect of an offender making his way back to 
England from Australia was unlikely.32  But the ease of 
modern global transportation has greatly reduced the 
effectiveness of exile at producing a high degree of victim-
specific incapacitation, although tighter international border 
security has perhaps counterbalanced this reduction to some 
degree.33
Mere physical distance between an offender and a would-
be victim no longer impedes all offenses.  In modern times, a 
person with an Internet connection in Australia can work all 
manner of mischief on residents of the United Kingdom.  But 
the intervening distance reduces the types of offenses the 
offender can commit against the relevant population (here, 
Britons)—assault or burglary would be difficult, for example.  
This example illustrates the intersection of offense-specific 
and victim-specific incapacitation—potential offenses against 
Australians are disregarded by the sentencing authority (a 
function of victim-specific incapacitation), but the 
punishment selected fails to totally impede all offenses 
against the relevant population and therefore reveals a lack 
of total offense-specific incapacitation. 
 
 
 32. Id. at 186 (“The moon was then, as it continues to be, inaccessible: upon 
earth there was no accessible spot more distant than New South Wales.”).  
 33. See Pritikin, supra note 12, at 1099 n.245 (declaring that exile is “no 
longer a viable option” given the “political subdivision of most inhabitable lands, 
as well as advances in communications and transportation technology”). 
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II. INCARCERATION’S INCAPACITATIVE SHORTCOMINGS 
After the fall of widespread notions of the rehabilitative 
benefits of imprisonment,34 incapacitation may now well be 
the primary purpose of incarceration.35  However, this 
“central technique of punishment”36 only partially 
incapacitates.37  Proper framing of this partial incapacitation 
sheds light on the benefits and shortcomings of imprisonment 
as a punishment.  It is unfortunate then, that all too often 
imprisonment is trotted out as a poster child for something 
that it is not—absolute incapacitation.38
A. Imprisonment’s Partial Offense-Specific Incapacitation 
  Suggesting that 
inmates lose all ability to commit crime for the duration of a 
prison sentence is simply outlandish and, as explained below, 
carries with it dangerous implications for how the justice 
system should view prison crime.  It is therefore important to 
be mindful of incarceration’s incapacitative shortcomings lest 
prison crime is discounted to zero and inmates are 
marginalized by exclusion from the relevant measuring 
population of “society” worthy of protection by the criminal 
law. 
Imprisonment reduces inmates’ ability to commit certain 
offenses, but falls well short of achieving total incapacitation 
of all offense conduct.  To recap, offense-specific 
incapacitation depends upon the amount of offense conduct 
that the punishment inhibits, and the amount of difficulty 
with which the offender can circumvent the barrier to re-
offending.  As discussed below, imprisonment impedes a fair 
amount of illegal conduct and generally places a relatively 
formidable barrier to escape. 
 
 34. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(b) (2d ed. 
2003) (chronicling criticism of rehabilitation as a justification for 
imprisonment); CAMPBELL, supra note 8, § 2.4 (same).  
 35. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001); ZIMRING & 
HAWKINS, supra note 11, at v, 14–15, 72.  
 36. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 158.  
 37. Incarceration comes in many forms.  The severity of the restrictions 
imposed upon prisoners largely dictates the incapacitative success of 
incarceration.  Solitary confinement in a secure facility unquestionably 
incapacitates more completely than imprisonment among a general prison 
population.  See PACKER, supra note 17, at 48.  For purposes of this essay, 
incarceration and imprisonment generally refer to general prison populations. 
 38. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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Incarceration in a general prison population totally 
removes inmates’ capacity to commit some offenses (like 
traffic infractions), partially impedes inmates’ ability to 
commit other offenses (like drug use), and imposes no barrier 
to inmates’ ability to commit other offenses (like assault).  
The level of difficulty an inmate has in accessing the 
resources necessary to commit the offense dictates the degree 
of incapacitation (in the above examples: a vehicle, a 
controlled substance, another person).  For some offenses, the 
barrier to re-offending is high—a prisoner will likely need to 
escape the prison in order to commit a traffic infraction.  For 
other offenses, the barrier to re-offending is relatively low—
an inmate may need to exert an extra measure of caution in 
procuring narcotics, but by no means is wholly incapacitated 
from doing so. 
Imprisonment confers the ability to commit some prison-
specific offenses.  Certain acts that are legal in the outside 
world—like tattooing—may be criminalized or penalized in 
the prison environment.39  The offense of escape is a prime 
example: a non-incarcerated person cannot commit this 
offense.  Thus, the punishment of imprisonment enables the 
commission of an offense that the inmate was previously 
unable to commit.40
On the whole, incarceration has significant incapacitative 
effects for a number of offenses.  But because escape is always 
possible, it fails to totally incapacitate inmates from 
committing any offenses.  And it enables the commission of 
certain offenses and has no incapacitative effect on others.  
Thus, imprisonment falls well short of achieving total 
incapacitation of all offense conduct. 
 
B. Imprisonment’s Partial Victim-Specific Incapacitation 
On the victim-specific incapacitation front, imprisonment 
is conceptually similar to exile.  The punishment redefines 
the population to which an offender has access: it trades the 
 
 39. Cf. Clifford Krauss, A Prison Makes the Illicit and Dangerous Legal and 
Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at A4 (describing a pilot program for legal 
tattooing instituted in select Canadian federal prisons).  
 40. The same is true of any partially incapacitative punishment that does 
not truly remove the offender’s ability to overcome the restraint, but outlaws 
the offender from doing so (e.g., deportation confers the ability to commit the 
offense of illegal re-entry). 
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population outside the prison walls for the population within.  
This trade erects a stiff barrier for offenders with a single 
preferred victim—an inmate who desires to assault his ex-
wife will find it difficult to do so.  Although incarceration 
causes a net loss of access to potential victims because the 
population inside the prison is undoubtedly smaller than the 
population outside of the prison, the world of likely future 
victims merely shifts away from non-incarcerated persons to 
inmates and correctional personnel.41
Highly restrictive forms of imprisonment, such as 
solitary confinement, have much greater incapacitative 
effects than confinement in a general prison population.
 
42
Returning to inmates confined in a general prison 
population, the victim-specific incapacitation attendant to 
imprisonment may be either a neutral byproduct of the 
punishment or a purposeful feature of the punishment.  Key 
to that determination is whether the governing authority 
includes other prisoners in the relevant measuring population 
worthy of protection.  If so, then imprisonment’s victim-
specific incapacitation is neutrally viewed by the governing 
authority: the inmate is surrounded by a different set of 
potential victims (other inmates rather than members of the 
“outside world”), but the governing authority does not prefer 
the victimization of either group.  If not, and the governing 
authority prefers the victimization of inmates to residents of 
the “outside world,” then the governing authority should view 
the victim-specific incapacitation positively. 
  
This incapacitative benefit is largely a product of reducing the 
population to which the inmate has access.  Like exile on a 
deserted island, solitary confinement sharply diminishes an 
inmate’s range of offenses because she lacks ready access to 
victims. 
By expressing a lack of regard for the victimization of 
other inmates, here is where numerous descriptions of the 
incapacitative benefits of imprisonment go off track.  
Incarceration is frequently described as achieving 
incapacitation, even absolute incapacitation, by removing 
 
 41. Likewise, release from prison carries victim-specific incapacitative 
effects by imposing barriers to access to inmates.  Upon release from prison, an 
inmate will find it virtually impossible to assault a former bunkmate who 
remains locked behind the prison walls. 
 42. See supra note 37. 
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inmates from “society.”43  If for no other reason, claims of 
absolute incapacitation fail because prisons are vulnerable to 
escape, and escapees unquestionably work mischief in the 
outside world.44  As explained above, the degree of 
incarceration’s victim-specific incapacitation is dependent 
upon the effectiveness of the barriers to escape.  If an inmate 
can escape imprisonment with ease, the punishment produces 
negligible victim-specific incapacitation because it creates 
little impediment to accessing any population—much like 
exiled offenders crossing the border back into Kansas.  Most 
prisons, while not easy to escape, are not impermeable.45
The more troubling subtext presented by these 
descriptions is the exclusion of people in prisons from the 
relevant measuring population of “society.”
  
Thus, claims of absolute incapacitation through incarceration 
descriptively miss the mark. 
46
 
 43. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2053 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that sentences of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole “[b]y definition . . . serve the goal of incapacitation by 
ensuring that . . . offenders . . . no longer threaten their communities”); 1 
LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 1.5(a)(2) (“If the criminal is imprisoned or executed, he 
cannot commit further crimes against society.”); Michele Cotton, Back with a 
Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal 
Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000) (“Incapacitation uses 
imprisonment to remove the offender from society to protect it from the danger 
he poses.”); Richard S. Frase, A More Perfect System: Twenty-Five Years of 
Guidelines Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005) (“Incapacitation 
prevents crime by imprisoning high-risk offenders, thus physically restraining 
them from committing further crimes against the public.”); James S. Gwin, 
Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 176 (2010) 
(“Incapacitation separates a defendant from society and physically prevents 
further crime.”); Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence 
Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 343, 347 (1999) (“While incarcerated, the agent is unable to commit 
further crimes.”); Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 630, 639 (1938) (discussing imprisonment: “It is one of 
the primary functions of organized society to protect itself against the criminal 
elements within it and this can ordinarily be accomplished only by completely 
isolating them.”).  This list could be expanded significantly; the cited works are 
merely illustrative. 
  Here again the 
 44. See, e.g., Bob Ortega, 2 Plead Guilty in Fatal Prison Escape, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Jan. 21, 2012, at B2.  
 45. See, e.g., id. 
 46. See Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 110 
n.154 (2010) (noting that the general failure to factor prison crimes into 
analyses of whether utilitarian rationales justify punishment is a weakness of 
such justifications); Leipold, supra note 11, at 556 (“Inmate-on-inmate crime 
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exile analogy is useful.  Imprisonment exiles inmates from 
the “outside world” to the “prison world.”  By measuring the 
incapacitative effects of imprisonment by how well it protects 
those in the “outside world,” these descriptions ascribe no 
negative value to offenses committed in the “prison world.”47  
If  offenses committed in the prison world are ignored, then 
imprisonment achieves a high level of incapacitation by 
safeguarding the relevant population (here, the outside 
world).48
But such is not the case.  The governing authority should 
and does have an interest in crimes committed in the prison 
world.  Solid evidence of this interest exists in the form of the 
criminalization of offenses committed against fellow 
inmates.
 
49  If the governing authority truly had no interest in 
what occurred in the prison world—like Britain’s lack of 
concern for what went on in New South Wales—then it would 
not criminalize and prosecute conduct that occurred there.  
Even so-called ‘victimless crimes’ such as drug use remain 
illegal in prison.50
 
may be largely invisible to the larger world, but that is no excuse for ignoring 
crimes committed while in prison in our [crime-reduction] calculations.” 
(footnote omitted)); Catherine M. Sharkey, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Is Blind 
Faith in Incapacitation Justified?, 105 YALE L.J. 1433, 1433 n.3 (1996) 
(reviewing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995)) (“Studies of the effect of 
incarceration on crime rates usually ignore crime within prisons.  Crimes 
committed within prison walls, if explicitly acknowledged in a utilitarian 
analysis of incapacitation, would reduce the calculated social benefit of crimes 
averted in society.”) (citations omitted).  
  Such criminalization demonstrates that 
 47. See JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 57–58 (6th ed. 2008) (suggesting that 
“incapacitation” may be better termed “segregation” of offenders from society 
both physically and symbolically “by implying that their welfare does not count 
as part of the social welfare.”); Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 888, 895 (1988) (“We may, in other words, isolate convicted criminals in 
order to convince ourselves that they are not a part of ‘society’ rather than 
because we think that we thereby protect a society that includes criminals.  
Imprisonment may change ‘society’ more by redefining its meaning than by 
reducing its level of violence.”).  
 48. Inmates do retain the ability to victimize people outside of prison in 
limited ways, such as by making threatening phone calls. 
 49. See, e.g.,  United States v. Delaney, 717 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(affirming first-degree murder conviction of federal inmate who strangled his 
cellmate). 
 50. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (2012) (criminalizing the possession of 
controlled substances in prison); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
2P1.2 (2013) (sentencing guideline for possessing contraband in prison). 
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prisons are part of “society” and inmates “count” as part of 
the relevant measuring population. 
But the governing authority’s interest in deterring crime 
in the prison world is not in pure equilibrium with its interest 
in deterring crime in the outside world.  Although the federal 
government has no rational preference for the victimization of 
Kansans versus Nebraskans, it may have a rational 
preference for the victimization of inmates versus the 
victimization of those in the outside world.  A rational reason 
for preferring prison crime over non-prison crime is the 
deterrent effect of the victimization of inmates.  Publicizing 
the victimization of inmates makes prison unattractive.51
On the other hand, prejudice against inmates should 
form no part of a preference for inmate victimization over 
non-inmate victimization.
  
Thus, prison crime, especially violent personal offenses, may 
deter some would-be criminals from offending because they 
wish to avoid imprisonment.  All other things being equal, a 
governing authority may therefore rationally prefer an 
assault of one of its inmates to an assault outside of prison. 
52
In any event, a deterrence-based preference for the 
victimization of inmates does not justify the conclusion that 
prison crime does not “count” or that inmates are not 
members of “society” worthy of protection.  If the governing 
  By definition, inmates are 
receiving their state-sanctioned just deserts through the 
punishment of incarceration.  Victimization of inmates at the 
hands of other prisoners should form no part of that desert, 
especially when such victimization is doled out non-
proportionately to the seriousness of the inmate-victim’s 
offense conduct.  Indeed, it is likely that the least hardened 
(and least culpable) offenders are the most likely to fall victim 
to inmate-on-inmate prison crime.  If anything, offenders in 
the outside world who have evaded punishment are more 
deserving of victimization than inmates; unlike inmates, 
these individuals owe an outstanding debt to society. 
 
 51. See, e.g., Sean Fewster, Fear Frees Drug Dealer, THE ADVERTISER 
(Austl.), Jan. 29, 2007, at 3 (reporting that sentencing judge found that 
offender’s fear of prison would serve as an “effective deterrent” against future 
crimes).  
 52. See KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 47, at 57 (“The prevalence 
of prison violence raises the question [of] whether incapacitation theory is truly 
concerned with reducing the risk of violent crime, or merely redistributing its 
risk from innocents to past offenders.”).  
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authority were so enamored with the deterrent effect of 
inmate victimization that it found that such victimization 
achieved a net positive, then it would institutionalize and 
package inmate victimization as part of the punishment.  The 
fact that governing authorities are unwilling to go so far 
demonstrates that inmate victimization is still viewed a net 
negative event even if it is preferable to the victimization of a 
non-inmate.  Thus, when properly viewed as a negative event, 
inmate victimization “counts”—and counts negatively—as an 
event within the relevant measuring population known as 
“society.” 
Wholly excluding people inside prisons from the 
measuring population implies that society lacks an interest in 
protecting prisoners and correctional personnel.  Lest we 
totally dehumanize prisoners by discounting prison crime to 
zero, this proposition fails on its face.  Crimes occur in prison.  
These crimes “count” because the people who commit those 
crimes and their victims are part of “society.”  Any statement 
that fails to account for prison crime in measuring the 
incapacitative effect of incarceration is both factually 
inaccurate and demeaning to people in prisons. 
CONCLUSION 
Incapacitation must be measured in both offense-specific 
and victim-specific terms.  Punishments that inhibit the 
commission of offenses achieve offense-specific incapacitation 
to the extent that the inhibition poses a barrier to 
reoffending.  Punishments that protect a particular 
population from victimization achieve victim-specific 
incapacitation to the extent that the punishment poses a 
barrier to victimizing a particular population. 
Incarceration achieves offense-specific incapacitation by 
wholly or partially restricting prisoners’ ability commit 
certain offenses.  Incarceration also achieves victim-specific 
incapacitation by redefining the population to which the 
prisoner has access.  However, the victim-specific 
incapacitation is only a beneficial byproduct of imprisonment 
to the extent that the governing authority prefers the 
victimization of inmates to the victimization of those in the 
outside world.  While the governing authority may rationally 
possess a marginal preference for the victimization of inmates 
because of the deterrent effects of deglamorizing prison life, 
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the victimization of inmates remains a net negative event.  As 
such, descriptions of the incapacitative effects of 
imprisonment that overstate its incapacitative benefits 
improperly exclude inmates from the relevant measuring 
population. 
 
